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DEMOCRATIZING TRANSITION IN TAIWAN
Yangsun Chou and Andrew J. Nathan

At 6:05 on the evening of September 28, 1986, Taiwan
opposition leader Fei Hsi-p'ing stood up in a meeting room of Taipei's
Grand Hotel and announced, "The Democratic Progressive Party is established!"
Capping a series of remarkable moves by both the ruling Kuomintang
(KMT) and the non-party opposition (tang-wai, hereafter TW), this announcement and its aftermath marked a potentially epochal step in Taiwan's political evolution. It also broke precedent in the worldwide
evolution of Leninist-style political systems, none of which has ever before
tolerated the formation of a significant opposition party. The bold changes
in Taiwan drew attention on the other side of the Taiwan Straits, where
political reform was also a focus of attention, and raised questions for U.S.
foreign policy. Taiwan's party system reform warrants a careful examination of the participants' motives, the reform process, the potential impact
within Taiwan and outside, and the reforms' theoretical significance.

1950-1986: Liberalization of a Leninist
Party-State
The Kuomintang was shaped by its founder, Sun Yat-sen, under Comintem tutelage in the 1920s as a Leninist-style party. The basic party structure established then endures today: selective membership recruitment; a
revolutionary and nationalist ideology; a centralized decision-making
structure under a Central Committee; a policy-making Central Standing
Committee and a policy-implementing secretariat with organization, intelligence, and propaganda departments; control of the army through a political cadre system; maintenance of a youth league; leadership over the
policies and personnel of the state apparatus; and-until recently-intoler-
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ance for the existence of any opposition party. (Like the CCP with the
"democratic parties," the KMT has long co-existed with two other small
parties that do not constitute a serious opposition.)
From the beginning, the Leninist structure stood in tension with nonLeninist strains in the party's tradition-a fact which made the KMT different from other Leninist parties. Under its ideology, Sun Yat-sen's
Three Principles of the People, the KMT did not define its role in terms of
the struggle between progressive and reactionary classes. Instead, it justified itself as a moral and technocratic vanguard capable of guiding national
construction and gradually introducing full constitutional democracy. (In
this way, the KMT ideology of "revolutionary democracy" resembled the
ideologies of other Leninist party-states in their post-mobilization phases,
such as the Soviet "state of the whole people" and "Chinese-style socialism.") After its break with the CCP in 1927 the KMT adopted an ideology of anticommunism, with procapitalist domestic policies and a proWest foreign policy, and all of this further opened it to the influence of
non-Leninist ideas. Upon establishing its rule on Taiwan the party justified its restriction of political and other rights-including the right to organize new political parties-not as necessities of the revolutionary state
but as temporary measures arising from the condition of civil war between
the KMT and CCP regimes. These restrictions were thus not embodied in
the basic constitutional order but in "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" and, under the authority of these
provisions, in a limited regime of martial law (chieh-yen). 1
Even before 1949, in keeping with Sun's ideas of tutelary democracy, the
KMT tried to make nominal progress away from party dictatorship toward constitutional democracy, for example by promulgating a new constitution in 1947 (the same constitution in effect in Taiwan today, although
it is modified by the Temporary Provisions just mentioned.) Starting in
1950 in Taiwan, gradual steps were taken to implement local self-rule at
the provincial and lower levels, while maintaining the national government
structure brought over from the mainland. In that year the Taiwan Provincial Assembly was established, its members indirectly elected by municipal- and county-level legislators for two-year terms. In 1954 for the first
time the provincial assemblymen were directly elected, for three-year
terms eventually changed to four. In 1969 elections were held for Taiwan
I. Shih-pao chou-k'an (hereafter SPCK), No. 86 (October 18-24, 1986), pp. 8-13. This is
the New York edition of the popular Taiwan newsweekly, Shih-pao hsin-wen chou-k(m. Also
see Hungdah Chiu and Jyh-pin Fa, "Law and Justice Since 1966," in James C. Hsiung et. a!.,
eds., Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience. 1950-1980 (New York: The
American Association for Chinese Studies, 198 I), pp. 314-330.
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delegates to the central government's Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and indirectly for the Control Yuan. As is well known, however,
the majority of seats in these organs continued to be held by mainland
delegates who had been elected in 1947 (see Table 1).
TABLE

1 Membership of Elected Central Government Organs
National
Assembly

Number of members
under constitution
Number elected
on the mainland
Number who came
to Taiwan
Of those still serving
Supplementary seats
elected in Taiwan
Overseas Chinese
members selected by
the President
Total number of
delegates now serving
Average age of those
now serving
Percent aged
69 or below
Percent aged 70-79
Percent aged
80 or above
Average deaths per
year, 1981-86
SOURCE:

Legislative
Yuan

Control
Yuan

3,136

882

257

2,841

760

180

1,576
899

470
222

104
35

91

74

24

0

27

10

990

323

69

74

71

70

23.6%
47.1%

31.4%
34.7%

38.5%
27.1%

29%

33.8%

34.2%

43.6

14.1

Shih-pao chou-k'an, No. 85 (October 11-17, 1986), p. 31.

Local elections brought a number ofnon-KMT politicians into the political arena, but it was not until the rise of the TW in the late 1970s that the
KMT faced a strong, quasi-organized opposition. The one possible exception to this statement was the abortive formation of a China Democratic
Party (Chung-kuo min-chu tang) by Lei Chen and several other politicans
in 1960. But the regime's rapid and severe response to this attempt
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showed that its Leninist instincts remained strong, and the COP dissolved
with Lei Chen's arrest.
By the 1970s economic growth had brought major changes to Taiwan
society. Average annual per capita income had increased from US$50 in
1941 to US$3, 175 in 1985. 2 The average annual rate of economic growth
was 11% from 1964 to 1973 and 7.7% from 1974 to 1984. 3 Despite increasingly severe export competition from mainland China (in terms of
labor costs) and South Korea (in terms of high-technology goods), Taiwan's 1985 exports totalled almost $34 billion, with the United States taking 48% of the total and Japan 11%. 4 The egalitarian policies pursued
under the principle of "People's Livelihood" had prevented extreme polarization of wealth: the total income of the richest fifth of the population
was only 4.4 times that of the poorest fifth. s The middle class now constitutes an estimated 3(}-50% of the total population. Over 46% of the population has attended at least junior middle school. 6
While economic and social change created a more sophisticated public,
the diplomatic and foreign-trade situations provided salient political issues.
Taiwan's diplomatic isolation has steadily increased since its expulsion
from the United Nations in 1971, de-recognition by Japan in 1972, and the
breaking of formal diplomatic relations by the United States in 1979. Except for the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong, Taiwan's economy is
the most trade-dependent in the world. In a recent China Times poll of
leaders in twelve industries, the respondents said that the weakest points of
the Taiwan economy were the overconcentration of export markets, the
lack of diplomatic relations with most countries in the world, and excessive import dependency on a few suppliers. 7 In other opinion polls the
public gives the government highest marks for its economic policies and
lowest marks for its diplomatic performance, which many view as too inflexible. 8 These issues have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral campaigns and legislative debates.
The emergence of the TW can be dated from the 1977 election, when
non-party politicians won 22 seats in the provincial assembly and four
posts as mayor or county magistrate. In the following year the term tangwai itself came into common use when Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh
2. Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1986), p. 33.
3. Chung-kuo lun-t'an (Taipei), No. 262 (August 25, 1986), p. 39.
4. SPCK, No. 82 (September 20-26, 1986), p. 54.
5. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, p. 60.
6. Chung-hua min-kuo t'ung-chi t'i-yao (Taipei: Hsing-cheng yuan, 1983), pp. 16-18.
7. SPCK, No. 82 (September 20-26, 1986), p. 54.
8. See, e.g., SPCK, No. 60 (April 20-26, 1986), pp. 6-7.
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and others organized a Tang-wai Campaign Assistance Corps (Tang-wai
chu-hsuan t'uan) to coordinate the campaigns of non-KMT candidates
throughout the island. In subsequent elections held in 1980, 1981, 1983,
and 1985, the KMT was generally able to get about 70% of the vote and
the TW and independent politicians about 30%.
Until 1986, the TW was not a party but a loosely knit movement consisting primarily of small personality-based factions absorbed in large part
in local issues. What drew these factions together was dissatisfaction with
the ruling party's position on the interlocked issues of Taiwan's future in
the international arena and the role of the KMT in the Taiwan political
system. Both the candidates and the electoral supporters of the TW consist predominantly (although not exclusively) of Taiwanese, not surprising
since 85% of the island's population is conventionally counted as
Taiwanese, and since under Taiwan's electoral system by far the majority
of the offices open for electoral competition are at the provincial level and
below. Although both the KMT and the state apparatus have been heavily
Taiwanized, the KMT remains mainlander-dominated at its highest levels,
and it defines Taiwan's status as part of China as being settled beyond
discussion.
The character of the TW as a predominantly Taiwanese political force
in a mainlander-ruled polity has naturally made the issue of Taiwan's relationship to the .mainland central to TW politics. On this issue the TW
politicians are ranged along a radical-moderate continuum. Few
Taiwanese favor reunification with the mainland. But the moderates are
willing to forego for the time being any open challenge to the KMT's rule
and to its one-China ideology, while the radicals-although they cannot
say so openly under censorshi~appear to favor some form of Taiwan
·independence, without KMT rule and, in some cases, under socialism {but
not under the PRC). Some among both radical and moderate TW politicians have called for transport, commercial, postal, and other contacts
with mainland China. They do so, however, not in order to promote
reunification but because they believe that the KMT response to the mainland's diplomacy has been too rigid, and that such contacts are necessary
in order to begin the search for a new relationship with the mainland and a
less isolated position in the world. Other TW issues include opposition to
the exclusive use of Mandarin on Taiwan television and to the promulgation of KMT ideology through the schools.
The radicals emerged as a strong force in the 1977 "Chung-li Incident,"
a violent demonstration against alleged election tampering in Chung-li
city. They showed still greater strength in 1979, when they mobilized a
series of demonstrations which culminated on December lO in a violent
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clash between demonstrators and police that became known as the "Kaohsiung Incident." In response, the government arrested and tried Shih
Ming-teh, Huang Hsin-chieh, and more than 60 others of whom eight received severe sentences, and closed the offices of Mei-/i-tao (Formosa)
magazine, which was the organization behind the demonstrations.
Beginning in 1984, TW politicians produced a series of magazines which
directed strong attacks at government policies and leaders on a wide range
of policy and personal issues. The government banned and closed many
magazines, but the TW evaded control by reopening the publications
under new names and by publishing magazines in the disguised form of
monthly or weekly book series. In 1985, two apparently governmentbacked libel suits were filed against TW magazines. Although the plaintiffs were successful in both cases, from the government's point of view the
broader results were less satisfactory. The verdicts were controversial; the
defendants argued that their freedom of speech and, in one case, legislative
immunity, had been abridged; the defendants' supporters staged demonstrations, including a series of send oft's for defendant Lin Cheng-chieh as
he prepared to serve his year-and-a-half prison term. 9 It became apparent
that conviction in a libel case could be turned into political capital.
Moderates continue to dominate among opposition politicians on the
island (the radicals' main base is overseas), but the exigencies of Taiwanese
politics have imparted an increasingly militant flavor to the moderates'
tactics. Despite the successes of KMT rule and the amelioration of mainlander-Taiwanese social relations, some Taiwanese voters have deep-seated
feelings of having been colonized, and they respond emotionally to the
martyr symbolism around such jailed leaders as the Kaohsiung Eight. In
this political culture mass rallies, emotional rhetoric, and confrontational
demonstrations are tools of electoral survival for policy moderates. Even
while adopting such tactics to some degree, moderates like K'ang Ninghsiang suffer constant criticism for being too soft on the KMT. The fractious Taiwanese political style alarms many mainlanders, outside as well as
inside the ruling party, who are used to more courtly, controlled maneuvering. It seems especially to alarm those in the security bureaucracy.
Ample room existed in the mid-1980s for a tragic misunderstanding between the two political cultures, which might have led to a vicious circle of
confrontation and repression.

9. SPCK, No. 81 (September 14-20, 1986), pp. 40-41.
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From Liberalization to Democratizing
Reform
In contrast to South Korea under the generals and Marcos' Philippines,
where challenges to the regime were met fairly consistently with repression
leading to further polarization, the response of the KMT to the growth
and increasing militance of the opposition was, until late 1985, a mix of
selective repression with institutional liberalization. The regime tried to
repress the radical wing of the TW while stepping up recruitment of
Taiwanese into the KMT, army, and government, including some in high
posts, and gradually liberalizing electoral institutions and the mediawhat Edwin A. Winckler calls a movement toward "soft authoritarianism." 10 Despite opposition from the security bureaucracy and many mainlanders, President Chiang Ching-kuo had been trying to accommodate the
TW as it developed. As early as 1978, he directed KMT officials to meet
with TW figures under the auspices of a prominent newspaper publisher,
Wu San-lien. 11 But such contacts stopped after the TW's relatively poor
performance in the 1983 elections.
The reform undertaken in 1986 represents a fundamental change of
course, moving toward what we would call democratizing reform. The
formation of an opposition political party does not by itself make Taiwan a
pluralist democracy, but it is the most important single step that could
have been taken in that direction. If the reform goes no further than to
legalize the new party (and others which may be formed), it will have a
large impact on Taiwan politics and, through enhanced electoral competition, will make the ruling party more accountable to the electorate. We
discuss other possible future developments in a section below.
The explanation for the change of course lies in large part with President and party Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo, who occupies a position of
supreme influence in the Taiwan political system similar to Deng Xiaoping's in the mainland. Both the initiative for the reform and the power to
implement it over substantial intraparty opposition lay with him. The inner story of his decision is not known, but the public record provides
enough information to reveal the general concerns that motivated him.
The long-term impetus for both liberalization and democratization came
from three factors described earlier: the KMT's ideological commitment
to constitutional democracy; the economic, social, and political maturation
of the population; and the increasing electoral appeal of the TW. But to
10. Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to
Soft Authoritarianism?," The China Quarterly 99 (September 1984), pp. 481-499.
II. Interview, K'ang Ning-hsiang, Taipei, January 2, 1987.
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understand Chiang's decision to shift from one type of reform to the other,
we need to look at the more immediate problems facing the regime in
1986.
The first of these was the succession problem. Chiang is 76 years old
and suffers from diabetes. Although he has a formal successor as president
in Vice President Lee Teng-hui, much of his power is personal rather than
institutional, and there is no one currently in the senior ranks of government who is likely to be able to replace him as the lynchpin of cooperation
between party conservatives and liberals and among party, state, army,
and security officials. In December 1985, on the 38th anniversary of the
implementation of the ROC constitution, Chiang addressed one element of
this problem by stating that he would not allow himself to be succeeded as
president by any member of his family nor by a military regime. To show
the firmness of his opposition to a dynastic succession, he posted his second son and potential successor, Chiang Hsiao-wu, to Singapore as deputy
commercial counselor in the Taiwan mission. In June 1986, he appointed
civilian official Wang Tao-yuan as Minister of Defense, signaling his intent
to diminish the role of military men in the cabinet. He also assigned his
younger brother, Chiang Wei-kuo, to be secretary of the National Security
Council, a move seen as providing a further guarantee for a peaceful and
legal succession. 12 The President may have felt that difficult and controversial, but necessary, reforms should be undertaken before he passed from
the scene rather than be left for his less well-equipped successors to handle.
Moreover, reform could contribute to a smoother transition by increasing
the legitimacy of the regime, reducing the motivation for the population to
become involved in political disorders, and setting in place improved
mechanisms for long-term recruitment of new leaders at all levels.
Additional concerns motivating the reform were a series of internal and
foreign shocks in 1985 and 1986. The first was the revelation that the 1984
assassination of U.S. businessman and writer Henry Liu (Liu Yi-liang, also
known as Chiang Nan) had been carried out at the behest of the head of
the Defense Ministry Intelligence Bureau. The second was the bankruptcy
of Taipei's Tenth Credit Cooperative due to mismanagement by officials
with ties to KMT politicians, an incident which led to the resignations of
two cabinet ministers. 13 A third was a forced modification in the government's policy of resistance to the PRC's "unification diplomacy." In May
1986, officials of the state-owned airline were forced into face-to-face negotiations with PRC airline representatives in order to arrange the return of
12. Shih-pao hsin-wen chou-k'an, No. 6 (June 22-28, 1986), pp. 4-7.
13. Chung-kuo lun·t'an, No. 228 (March 25, 1985), pp. 8-24, and No. 238 (August 25.
1985), pp. 12-15.
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a cargo plane which its pilot had flown to Guangzhou. Although much of
the public welcomed the government's flexibility, at the same time, the
event was perceived as weakening its "three-no" policy (no negotiations,
no compromise, and no contacts).
Such incidents suggested the need to revitalize the ruling party and government. On the international scene, in addition, political reform offered
the possibility of enhancing the image of a regime that is especially vulnerable to foreign opinion because of its trade dependence and diplomatic isolation. Especially in the United States, where human rights issues exert a
substantial influence on foreign policy, the maintenance of martial law has
long been a public-relations embarrassment for Taiwan's supporters-a
fact often brought to the President's attention by sympathetic high-level
American visitors.
Finally, the initiation of bold reform steps in 1986 offered the possibility
of strengthening the KMT's appeal in the elections scheduled for December 6 to fill seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. Chiang must have known that by initiating reform in the months leading up to
a major election he ran the risk of entangling the reform process with the
preelection maneuvering of both sides. His decision to do so suggests that
he thought the advantages outweighed the dangers.

Managing Political Reform
"The way of the reformer is hard," Samuel P. Huntington has observed. 14
The reformer must maintain a concentrated hold on power in order to be
able to disperse it, and must implement reform measures quickly enough
to prevent the consolidation of conservative opposition, but not so quickly
as to allow the pace of events to get out of control. These problems indeed
faced Chiang Ching-kuo in 1986.
The first challenge was to tum a personal decision for reform into a
party program. Chiang sought the understanding of the strong group of
senior- and middle-level party conservatives, concentrated in the ideological, military, and security sectors, who feared that any relaxation of martial law or the ban on parties would create an opening for communist
subversion, Taiwan independence activity, or an alliance of the two. At
the Third Plenum of the KMT's 12th Central Committee in March 1986,
Chiang reminded the delegates of the party's long-standing goal of implementing constitutional democracy, and said that the time had come to
14. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 344.
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make further progress toward this goal. 15 After the session, on April9, he
appointed a twelve-man task force of Standing Committee members to
suggest reform measures. This powerful temporary organ became a virtual
politbureau above the Standing Committee, entrusted with the power to
establish the party's reform strategy in line with Chiang's wishes. It was
headed by former President Yen Chia-kan, a technocrat, and former Vice
President Hsieh Tung-min, a Taiwanese politician associated with the
KMT moderate wing, and composed of the most powerful figures in the
party, both liberal and conservative.
In June, the task force reported a bold, but vague, six-point reform proposal:
1. To conduct a large-scale supplementary election to the central representative organs (the Legislative and Control Yuans and the National Assembly) in order to address the problem of superannuation and deaths of
members.
2. To put local self-government on a legal basis. (The progress made so
far in instituting local self-government in Taiwan has been carried out
under an administrative order rather than a law. The pertinent legislation
has been tabled in the Legislative Yuan since 1952. The main problem has
been that the law would provide for direct popular election of the Taiwan
provincial governor and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. These officials are currently appointed by the central government, and the KMT has
feared that their direct election would create strong popularly-based rivals
to its own politicians.)
3. To simplify the national security laws. (Under martial law, the government has established a complex set of security orders, some overlapping
with the provisions of the regular legal system, and many provisions of
which have not been used.)
4. To provide a legal basis for formation of new civic associations. (Formation of new civic associations is banned under martial law. The current
law on civic associations does not provide for the registration of new parties, and the election and recall law does not provide for their participation
in elections.)
5. To strengthen public order.
6. To strengthen party work. 16
After receiving its report, President Chiang ordered the committee to work
out more detailed proposals for the third and fourth items first.
15. SPCK, No. 86 (October 18-24, 1986), pp. 8-9.
16. SPCK. No. 85 (October 11-16, 1986), p. 12.
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Meanwhile, Chiang re-opened the "channel" (kou-t'ung) to the TW,
hoping to co-opt TW leaders into sharing a stake in an orderly reform
process. In May, he directed KMT party officials to hold talks with representatives of the TW through the good offices of four mediators. The
mediators were senior presidential adviser T'ao Bai-ch'uan, aged 83, a
long-time KMT liberal and former member of the Control Yuan, and
three National Taiwan University professors, Hu Fo, Yang Kuo-shu, and
Li Hung-hsi-men who had already been involved in behind-the-scenes
negotiations in 1984 between the government and the TW that averted a
confrontation over the illegal formation of the Tang-wai Research Association on Public Policy (TRAPP), a quasi-political partyP The KMT was
represented by the three deputy secretaries-general of the party Central
Policy Commission, Liang Su-jung, Hsiao T'ien-tsan, and Huang Kuangp'ing. Eight delegates were selected to represent the TW, including K'ang
Ning-hsiang and You Ch'ing; one of them, the brother of imprisoned TW
leader Huang Hsin-chieh, declined to participate.
According to informed observers, the President's intention was to allow
TRAPP to register legally and to organize local branches that could nominate candidates, carry out election campaigning, and serve as a political
party in all but name. In return, he hoped to delay the formation of a fullscale opposition party until after the election. At the first "channel" meeting, held on May 10 at a Taipei restaurant, the two sides accepted three
common principles: respect for the constitution, cooperative efforts to
maintain political harmony, and agreement in principle by the KMT to
allow the TW to register TRAPP under the provisions of the civic associations law. 18 But this agreement displeased some TW politicians, who argued that it put the TW in an inferior position to the KMT, which was
itself unregistered under that law. The second scheduled channel meeting
on May 24 broke down over this issue.
The approach of the election had made it difficult for the TW to compromise. The KMT's excellent performance in the 1983 elections convinced many TW leaders that they would need the best possible campaign
organization to hold their own in the coming contest, which would be the
last electoral opportunity until 1989. In addition, the fall of Marcos in the
Philippines and the increasing militance of the opposition party in South
Korea encouraged impatience with a slow pace of change. Overseas, exiled politician Hsu Hsin-liang and others had already started to form a
"Taiwan Democratic Party." Given the militant style of Taiwanese politics, many TW politicians felt that the voters would not view them as a
17. Interview, Professor Hu Fo, Taipei, January I, 1987.
18. SPCK, No. 64 (May 18-24, 1986), pp. 6-11.
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serious opposition if they did not insist on their right to organize within
the island. 19
While continuing to insist that TRAPP and its branches were illegal, the
government did not move against it. But Minister of Justice Shih Ch'iyang warned in late September, just a few days before the new party was
founded, that the premature formation of a full-scale political party would
be illegal and would be treated as such. 20
Despite this warning, the TW politicians meeting at the Grand Hotel on
September 28 decided to take the next step. The meeting had originally
been called to finalize the list of TW candidates. (The room had been
reserved ostensibly for a meeting of the Rotary Club.) That morning,
however, Fei Hsi-p'ing, K'ang Ning-hsiang, and other moderates recommended altering the agenda to consider establishing a preparatory committee for a new party. More militant delegates argued for establishment of
the new party on the spot. This might be the last gathering of a large
number of TW figures for a long time; moreover, the government was less
likely to arrest the participants while they were official election candidates
than at any other time. Once a new party was established, they argued,
there would be time enough to appoint committees to draft its program
and charter. The name of the new party was suggested by senior TW figure and Taipei representative to the Legislative Yuan, Hsieh Chang-t'ing,
who argued that it should include neither "Taiwan" nor "China" in order
to avoid taking a position on the issue of Taiwan's future relations with the
mainland. After discussion, 132 of those present signed their names to the
declaration of the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 21
Some participants left the Grand Hotel after the historic meeting of September 28 convinced that they would be arrested as soon as they came
outside. DPP leaders hastened to assure President Chiang through private
channels that the new party respected the ROC constitution and opposed
communism and Taiwan independence, 22 but its leaders were unwilling to
take such a conciliatory stance publicly.
Indeed, there was strong preference among KMT conservatives to respond to the formation of the DPP by arresting the participants. President
Chiang, however, chose to declare the new party illegal and refused to
recognize it, meanwhile speeding the pace of drafting the new civil organizations law that would legalize the party retroactively. He directed the
twelve-man task force to hold urgent meetings to draft specific recommen19.
20.
21.
22.

SPCK, No. 81 (September 14-20, 1986), pp. 38-39.

Ibid.
SPCK, No. 84 (October 4-10, 1986), p. 7, and interviews, Taipei, January 2, 1987.
Interview, Taipei, January I, 1987.
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dations for reform of the martial law system and political parties ban. He
held a series of meetings in late September with top party, military, and
intelligence officials to seek support for his views. 23
On October 15, Chiang was able to push resolutions through the KMT
Central Standing Committee adopting the two key reform proposals. The
first called for the abolition of martial law and its replacement with a national security law. Under this proposal the national security law (expected to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan in early 1987) would
generally ban the same crimes as were banned under martial law, but
would define them more carefully, decrease the penalties, and put the cases
of civilian defendants before civilian courts. The national security law
would also replace martial law provisions for entry and exit control, seacoast and mountain-area defense, and so on. The second resolution called
for the revision of the law on civil organizations so as to reverse the ban on
formation of new political parties. According to press leaks in late 1986,
the revised law, which would be submitted to the Legislative Yuan somewhat later than the new national security law, would allow the registration
of new political parties which adopt party constitutions and platforms;
compete legally for power through the electoral system; and support anticommunism, the constitution, and national unity (i.e., not Taiwan independence).24 These three conditions are likely to become a focus of contention between the DPP and the government in early 1987. DPP leaders
contend that the government has no right to insert KMT party policies
(anti-communism and anti-Taiwan independence) into the registration requirements imposed on other parties. Observers generally assume these
differences can somehow be resolved, perhaps through further use of the
KMT-opposition "channel."
Meanwhile, the KMT demanded that the DPP refrain from moving beyond the preparatory phase of party formation. The KMT also challenged
the DPP to make clear its political stand. President Chiang announced
that the new party would not be tolerated if it did not accept the three
basic principles just described. 25 On October 11 the DPP gave its first,
somewhat ambiguous public response, stating that it stood for respect for
the constitution and that it would not cooperate with any political force
advocating violence. 2 6

23. SPCK, No. 86 (October 18-24, 1986), p. 6.
24. E.g., Chung pao (New York) (October 31, 1986), p. 2; Pei-Mei jih-pao (New York)
(December 17, 1986), p. I.
25. SPCK, No. 90 (November 15-21, 1986), p. 8.
26. Chung-kuo shih-pao (Taipei), November 7, 1986, p. 2.
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Reform Tested: November-December
1986
The period immediately preceding the December 6 election posed a major
test for the firmness of Chiang Ching-kuo's reform decision and his managerial skill, and a test as well for the statesmanship of the DPP. The key
question was how the long-repressed, potentially explosive issue of Taiwan's status would be introduced into the political dialogue. If this question had not been raised, the reform would have been illusory; if it had
been pressed too far or too fast, the reform might have been aborted.
The stance of the DPP came into clearer focus on November 10 whendespite the government's warning that such an action would be illegal-it
held its first National Representative Congress and adopted a party charter, a 34-article "Basic Program" and a 139-article "Action Program." 27
The Congress elected Chiang P'eng-chien (David P. C. Chiang) as chairman. Chiang, a member of the Legislative Yuan, was a defense lawyer at
the trial of the Kaohsiung Incident defendants, and is considered a representative of the younger and more radical wing of the DPP. His chief rival
for the post was Fei Hsi-p'ing, a mainlander member of the Legislative
Yuan supported by DPP moderates. On the key question of Taiwan's future, the basic program advocated "self-determination" by ballot of "all
residents of Taiwan." The DPP also called for rejoining the U.N., leaving
unstated whether the application should be in the name of China or of
Taiwan. As its party flag, the DPP adopted a white cross against a green
background, with a silhouette of the island of Taiwan in the middle of the
cross, symbols which bear no visible relationship to those of the KMT or
the Republic of China. (The green reflects the party's embrace of newly
popular ecological issues.) Although the term "independence" was thus
avoided, the party's position appeared to contradict the KMT's insistence
that the status of Taiwan as a part of China is already settled.
Both the government and the DPP faced their next challenge with the
attempted return from abroad of radical TW politician Hsu Hsin-liang. A
Taiwanese and former KMT member, Hsu had broken with the party and
was elected as a TW candidate to the post of T'ao-yuan county magistrate
in 1977, at the time of the Chung-li Incident. In 1979 he was deprived of
this position by the Control Yuan for his participation in the demonstrations preceding the Kaohsiung Incident. Hsu went into exile in the United
States, where he joined the Taiwan independence movement. In late 1984
he was elected first deputy general secretary of the newly formed Taiwan
Revolutionary Party based on the east coast of the United States. In vari27. Chung-kuo lun-t'an, No. 268 (November 25, 1986), pp. 30-33.
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ous of his writings or in declarations he has signed, he has called for "the
complete disappearance of [the KMT regime] from the face of the earth"
and the waging in Taiwan of an urban guerrilla war of socialist revolution. 28 In 1981 the Taiwan government issued a warrant for Hsu's arrest
on charges of rebellion.
Like Kim Dae-jung and Benigno Aquino, Hsu was drawn by the prospect of an election to try to reenter the political arena at home. In May
1986, he announced his departure from the Taiwan Revolutionary Party
and the establishment in Los Angeles of a preparatory committee for a
Taiwan Democratic Party (T'ai-wan min-chu tang). In October, after the
formation of the DPP, Hsu transformed his new party into an overseas
organization of the DPP. He announced his intention to return to Taiwan
to campaign for the DPP, and, following Kim Dae-jung's precedent, invited a number of Taiwanese and Americans-including Ramsey Clark
and Linda Gail Arrigo (an American graduate student and the wife of the
jailed Shih Ming-teh)-to accompany him on the flight home.
Because of Hsu's popularity with the Taiwanese electorate, his actions
created a dilemma for both the KMT and the DPP. Although the government had issued a warrant, it did not wish to arrest him on the eve of the
election. Most DPP politicians also preferred not to be encumbered at this
sensitive juncture with the problem of his arrest, but neither could they
square their party platform with asking him to stay away.
Hsu was eventually kept out of the country, but not without three violent incidents, one of them Taiwan's largest since the Kaohsiung Incident.
The first occurred on November 14 when a Hsu ally, Lin Shui-ch'iian, and
five colleagues attempted to precede him back to Taiwan. Lin was denied
entry at the airport because he did not have a visa. Several hundred TW
supporters, who had come to the airport to welcome Lin, clashed with
airport police and two persons were injured. The second and major incident occurred on November 30 when, in expectation of Hsu's arrival, an
estimated 10,000 supporters gathered at Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek International Airport. Hsu, meanwhile, was held up at Narita Airport in Japan
where the airlines honored a Taiwan government request to deny him permission to embark for Taiwan. During a standoff of nine hours at the
Taiwan airport, police used water cannons and tear gas on the crowd.
Twenty-six police vehicles as well as vehicles of the China Broadcasting
Company and the China Television Service were overturned and damaged,
and more than a score of policemen were injured. In the third incident, on
28. See especially his series, "Ke-rning wan-sui," in Mei-li-tao chou-k 'an (Los Angeles),
Nos. 91-95 (May 29-July 3, 1982), and his preface to the series, "Tu-shih you-chi-tui shouts'e," in Mei-li-tao chou-k'an, Nos. 105-108 (September IS-October 9, 1982).
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December 2, Hsu managed to arrive at the Taiwan airport on a Philippine
Airlines plane under an assumed name. He was denied entry, but several
thousand demonstrators, some reportedly armed with staves, clashed
again with police, leading to a number of arrests and injuries. 29
For the KMT reformers, the strength of popular support for Hsu after
six years' absence came as a shock, especially in view of his advocacy of a
violent anti-KMT revolution. The events also surprised some leaders of
the DPP. Although the party had never recognized Hsu's overseas
branch, it felt obliged to participate in the welcoming activities because of
Hsu's popularity and because of the DPP's friendly links with Taiwanese
organizations in the United States. The DPP stance was that it welcomed
Hsu's return because of humanitarian considerations and out of respect for
human rights. But after the second violent incident, while denouncing the
use of water cannons and tear gas by police, the DPP also criticized the
violence of the demonstrators, called on the government to identify and
prosecute the perpetrators, and stated that any DPP member involved
would be punished under party discipline. The party further announced
that it was canceling a series of planned rallies in order to avoid any possible further outbreak of violence. 30
The December 6 elections were held only four days after Hsu Hsinliang's third attempt to return. The results contained several messages for
the leaders of both parties. 31 First, to the relief of both, they went off
peacefully. Second, although the election confirmed the dominance of the
KMT, the DPP showing was also strong. The results must be interpreted
in light of the structure of the Taiwan political system, which limits the
campaign to two weeks and restricts publicity, expenditures, and access to
the mass media, and in which there normally is considerable vote buying
and other irregularities. 32 Despite these disadvantages, the DPP got
18.90% of the vote in the National Assembly election, electing 11 of its 25
candidates, and 22.17% in the Legislative Yuan election, electing 12 of its
19 candidates. Counting independent and minor party votes, the total
non-KMT poll was a bit above 30% of the vote. 33
The strength of militant sentiment in the electorate was shown by the
overwhelming victories won by some of the more radical DPP candidates.
The largest number of votes of any candidate island-wide was won by Hsu
29. See the series of reports in SPCK, Nos. 91-93 (November 22-December 12, 1986).
30. SPCK, No. 93 (December 6-12, 1986), p. 19.
31. SPCK, No. 94 (December 13-19, 1986), pp. 3-25.
32. See an Asia Watch Report, "Elections in Taiwan, December 6, 1986: Rules of the
Game for the 'Democratic Holiday'" (Washington, D.C.: Asia Watch, November 1986).
33. Chung-yang jih-pao (International Edition), December 8, 1986, p. I.
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lung-shu, wife of Chang Cbiin-hung, in prison because of his participation
in the Kaohsiung Incident. The second heaviest vote-getter was Hung
Ch'i-cb'ang, a former member of the radical Editors' and Writers' Association, and the fourth largest was Hsu Hsin-liang's brother, Hsu Kuo-t'ai.
Hsu had been at the head of the airport demonstrators both times that his
brother attempted to return.
However, some moderate DPP leaders also fared well. Senior TW politician K'ang Ning-hsiang, who bad suffered a surprise defeat in his run for
the Legislative Yuan in the 1983 election, was resoundingly reelected from
Taipei city. Other important moderate victors were Huang Huang-hsiung,
Ch'iu Lien-hui, and You Ch'ing.
A further indication of the strength of the opposition came in the surprising victories of three DPP candidates in occupational constituencies,
which the KMT normally closely controls (not all seats in the two directly
elected bodies are elected by geographic constituencies; a number are reserved for occupational groups). In the trade union constituency, DPP
candidates defeated the heads of both the provincial and the nation!l}-level
trade union organizations for one seat each in the Legislative Yuan and
National Assembly. Another DPP candidate won election to the National
Assembly from the commerce sector.
On the other hand, the strength of the KMT showing paid tribute to
that party's deep organizational base and to the preference of many among
Taiwan's affiuent population for continuity and stability. Among KMT
candidates, strong showings were made by candidates with fresh images,
reform leanings, or athletic, show business, or academic credentials. The
outstanding example was the victory of reformist Chao Shao-k'ang, the top
vote-getter in Taipei city. On the other hand, in an unprecedented defeat
for retired military men, Taipei voters rejected a former air force vicecommander.

Prospects
For the DPP, the biggest question is whether ·it can stay together, given its
essential nature as a coalition of independent factions. The party's factionalism is reflected in the rules it adopted at its November 10 congress. The
DPP made itself an elite party, with new members admitted only on the
nomination of at least three members (by early November, total membership was reportedly about 1400). 34 The purpose of this rule is apparently
to prevent both competition among factions for control of the organization
through recruitment of new members and infiltration by the KMT. De34. Chung-pao (New York), November 8, 1986, p. 2.
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spite its small size, the party has a 31-person Central Executive Committee, an It-person Central Standing Executive Committee, an 11-person
Central Consultative Committee, and a five-person Central Standing Consultative Committee, thus offering representation in policy-making organs
to every faction. In order further to protect each faction's prerogatives,
the national congress is to meet yearly (as against every five or six years for
the KMT) and the party chairman is limited to one non-renewable oneyear term. There is reason to wonder whether a party constructed so carefully to prevent concentration of power can survive as a party.
The question is all the more pressing given the ideological split among
moderate and radical members. The DPP will be under intense pressure
from the KMT and the electorate to define the meaning it gives to "selfdetermination" and to define the policy and organizational relationship between itself and the Taiwan independence movement. There is a demand
from Taiwanese organizations overseas, such as the influential, tacitly
proindependence Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), that
the DPP establish overseas branches. This possibility is tempting because
of the political support such overseas branches could provide in Washington. 35 Yet overseas branches are likely to serve as points of influence for
independence forces. The DPP may split over issues like this, or the government may repress the new party if it evolves a clear proindependence
position.
This prospect clearly worries the PRC government as well. Given the
PRC's announced policy that Taiwan may keep its own political system
even after reunification, the PRC is in no position to object to any political
reform the Taiwan authorities want to carry out. In keeping with its
United Front policy, Beijing has welcomed the formation of the new
party. 36 According to Hong Kong sources, the Chinese authorities see no
likelihood of the DPP taking power in Taiwan in the near future. 37 However, a PRC foreign ministry spokesman has reiterated Beijing's opposition
to Taiwan independence, pointedly adding "or self-determination." 38 The
PRC even seems to be using the existence of the new party as the basis for
a fresh appeal to the KMT for early reunification. "The future of the
Kuomintang," stated Peng Zhen in his speech commemorating the 120th
anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth, "hinges on its cooperation with the

35. SPCK, No. 95 (December 20-26, 1986), p. 28.
36. Chung-pao (New York), November I, 1986, p. I.
37. Chung-pao, December 20, 1986, p. I, reporting material carried in Kuang-chiao-ching
(Hong Kong), December 16, 1986.
38. The New York Times, December 14, 1986, p. 14.
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Communist Party." 39 For the United States as well, the prospect of avocal pro-independence force in the island is also unwelcome, chiefly because
of the disturbance it would cause in U.S.-PRC relations. 40
DPP politicians interviewed early in 1987 in Taipei state that these concerns are misplaced. Self-determination, they say, means simply that the
residents of the island should be consulted in any decision concerning its
future, rather than having their fate determined by the KMT, PRC, and
U.S. without their participation. They argue that it is only common sense
to say that the island's residents face a long-term choice among three alternatives: maintaining the status quo, reuniting with the mainland, or becoming independent. By calling for self-determination the DPP is not
advocating any of these, but only the right of the residents to decide. It
remains to be seen whether the KMT will accept this position as falling
within the bounds of acceptable political discussion, and whether the DPP
itself can remain united on the position.
Whether or not the DPP survives in its present form, the lifting of the
ban on party organizations may well introduce still other competitors into
the political arena. By late 1986, three potential parties were already beginning to take shape under the following tentative names: 41 the Democratic Unity Party (Min-chu t'ung-i tang) under former KMT Legislative
Yuan member Lei Yii-ch'i, which would represent predominantly middle
class non-Taiwanese and would stand for peaceful reunification with the
mainland; the People's Livelihood Cooperation Party (Min-sheng hsieh-li
tang) under Kaohsiung politician Su Yii-chu, a local party which would
have a chiefly poor working-class constituency and the support of some
retired soldiers; and the China Patriotic Party (Chung-kuo ai-kuo tang)
under right-wing KMT journalist Chung Shu-nan, who has spoken of
forming this new party to oppose the DPP but is unlikely to do so since he
would then have to leave the KMT.
At least five additional political groups or social forces can be identified
which are not closely tied to the KMT and have not yet been included in
the DPP. These include a group of prounification nationalists around
Hsia-ch 'ao magazine; a group of activists concerned mainly with ecological
issues; Christian groups, including the Presbyterians who are politically
active, and the fundamentalist New Testament Church; a number of local
independent politicians; and liberal academics and professionals. Under
the new civil associations law such forces might organize parties or interest
groups, or they may align with the DPP, or remain unorganized.
39. Beijing Review, No. 46 (1986), p. 23.
40. See editorial in the Washington Post, December 4, 1986.
41. Chung-pao (New York), October 8 and 9, November II and 20, 1986, all on p. 2.
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Conspicuous by its absence from these lists is a potential labor or welfare-state party. Taiwan has never had a strong, independent labor movement; instead, the KMT has always been careful to assure its own political
dominance of labor. The success of the DPP in this election in winning
two seats in the labor constituency will probably motivate the KMT to
redouble its organizing efforts in the unions to shore up its control.
The future evolution of Taiwan's political system will, of course, depend
even more upon the post-reform adaptation of the KMT than on the opposition. Those who lightly compare Taiwan's situation to that of South Korea or the Philippines forget that the KMT, for all its problems, is a
vigorous organization. Its strengths include a nationalistic ideology with
considerable appeal; much fresh blood among its members, including
many Taiwanese (an estimated 70% of party membership); and a cadre of
skilled technocrats, strong local political machines, control over the media
and, through the political commissar system, control over the military.
The KMT would probably perform well in elections even without the special advantages it enjoys under the current electoral system, and it is unlikely to give up all of these advantages in the course of reform. Hence it is
unlikely that the Taiwan political system will quickly evolve into a true
two-party system.
Rather, assuming the democratic reforms are carried forward, Taiwan is
more likely to remain for the foreseeable future a hegemonic party system
like that of Mexico, or possibly to evolve into a Japanese-style dominantparty system in which the KMT controls over half the votes while a variety of smaller parties share the remainder. Also possible, if the DPP stays
together, is the development of a "one-and-a-half-party system" with a
dominant KMT and a permanent minority opposition part~.
To the extent that a hegemonic, dominant-party, or party-and-a-half
system allows freedom of political organization and advocacy, it provides
mechanisms that strengthen political competition and hence, government
accountability to the people. However, KMT rule is so intimately intertwined with all aspects of the Taiwan system that there would have to be
other far-reaching reforms before democratization could be said to have
gone very far. Among the obstacles to fuller democratization are, first,
anti-democratic biases built into the constitutional structure. ·As long as
the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly are
reserved for mainland constituencies, there can be no realistic possibility of
shaking KMT control of these organs. This problem has already been
targeted for reform; it was the first point of the six presented by the 12man working group in June. In addition, as long as the President is indirectly elected by the National Assembly, and the Taiwan governor and
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Taipei and Kaohsiung mayors appointed by the central government, the
Taiwan electorate cannot control the selection of the country's top officials. Other barriers are government and party control of the press, and
banning and censorship of the opposition press; advantages to the ruling
party, decsribed earlier, provided by the rules of the electoral system; the
practice of imprisonment for political crimes (according to Amnesty International, as of August 1986 there were approximately 110 "prisoners of
conscience" in Taiwan42); interpenetration of party and government structures along classic Leninist lines, for example, the relationship between the
Government Information Office and the party's Cultural Work Commission, or between the government's Overseas Chinese Commission and the
party's Overseas Work Commission (similarly, party-controlled military
intelligence organs perform functions which in non-Leninist states are the
purview of state organs); the political commissar system iri the army,
which gives the KMT controi over the military; and finally, the existence
of state and party-managed enterprises.
Although some of these problems are on the current reform agenda,
most of them are not; completion of the current reform, however, may
create momentum for further democratization. On the other hand, the
possibility always exists that a coalition of party conservatives, military
and security personnel, and economic technocrats could call a halt to the
reform process under various scenarios: if the call for Taiwan independence grew too strong, if there was violence, or if a succession crisis led to
instability at the top.

Theoretical Implications
Taiwan's reforms are being closely watched in China, which is also involved in political reform. Although we have no hard evidence of the unofficial reaction, news of Taiwan's progress has probably been among the
factors spurring public impatience with the slow pace of political reform
on the mainland-impatience expressed in the form of student and worker
demonstrations in several cities.
Whether the Taiwan reforms can serve the mainland in any way as a
model is a more difficult question. So far, during the current wave of discussions of reform in the PRC, the question of allowing the formation of
opposition parties has not been publicly raised (except, reportedly, in wall
posters). But some democrats both outside and inside the CCP advocated
a multiparty system during the 1978-1981 Democracy Movement, so it is
42. Amnesty International, "Republic of China (Taiwan), Political Imprisonment in Taiwan," Amnesty document ASA 38/11/86, dated August 1986.
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likely that such ideas still have supporters today. 43 To PRC pluralists, the
changes in Taiwan can only encourage the belief that China's cultural
background and Leninist patterns of organization do not preclude reform
of the party system.
Even so, prospects for multipartyism on the mainland have to be
counted as slight. As we noted at the outset, the KMT has been an anomaly among Leninist parties because it lacks a Marxist ideology and has
been, through most of its history, pro-Western and procapitalist. The applicability of its experience to other Leninist parties is thus limited. Moreover, the mainland Chinese population is far less prosperous and educated
than Taiwan's, and in this sense the social conditions for pluralism are less
promising. Also in contrast to Taiwan, the mainland's succession problem
seems, at least outwardly, to be well under control, and the PRC's international standing is high. And unlike Taiwan, the PRC is not dependent on
the United States economically and militarily, and hence has less concern
with American and other foreign public opinion. In short, the PRC leaders lack the various stimuli for party system reform that motivates Chiang
Ching-kuo. While reform of the role of the single ruling party is a major
part of the mainland reform agenda, there are many signs that the leaders
are not considering reform of the party system itself, or even that they
intend to allow the question to be publicly discussed.
If the Taiwan case carries no easy lessons for the mainland, it does seem
relevant to other cases of democratizing reform and to the growing theoretical study of the democratization of authoritarian regimes. In a 1984
article, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," Samuel P. Huntington suggested that the particular conjunctions of circumstances that had
created the world's democracies were not likely to be repeated. 44 But the
large number of democratic transitions in recent years-Spain, Portugal,
Argentina, Peru, and others-have required political scientists to develop
·
new perspectives on the problem.
One line of thought has been that there are circumstances in which relatively democratic institutions are more functional for elites than authoritarian ones. 45 Given permissive economic, social, and international
43. See Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985),
Chapter 5.
44. Political Science Quarterly, 99:2 (September 1984), pp. 193-218.
45. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian
State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in
Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 285-318, and Adam
Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo
O'Donnell et al., eds. Transition From Authoritarianism: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 47-63.
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conditions, a turn toward democracy may be an attractive option for an
elite facing succession problems, an economic crisis, mass unrest, international pressure, or other problems. In such conditions relatively democratic institutions offer the possibility of improving a regime's abilities to
legitimate itself, to regulate social conflict, to recruit successors, to gain
access to and make use of information for policy making, and so on.
Our analysis of Chiang Ching-kuo's motives for the reform suggests he
is in fact seeking these benefits. Indeed, democratization may be profitable
for Taiwan in the even more concrete sense of helping to stimulate the
confidence of foreign investors and trade partners. In contrast to the disincentive effects of the instability and apparent lack of political consensus in
a society such as South Korea, one of Taiwan's main competitors for investment funds, the perceived progress in Taiwan and the perception that
this progress adds to political stability should help to bring in investment.
Since democratization in Taiwan is just beginning and still faces many
problems, it is too early to say how fully the Taiwan case will confirm this
functional theory of democratic transitions. But the theory seems to provide a useful perspective for understanding the reform decisions made by
the end of 1986. So far, the Taiwan experience has confirmed the proposition that democratizing reform can strengthen a regime. In addition, Chiang Ching-kuo's handling of the reform process provides useful lessons for
reformers elsewhere in the skills of consensus-building and conflict management.
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